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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
In regard to DAR.RELL WAYNE MORRIS, 
Witness/ Appellant. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DANNY LEROY LOGUE, Appellate Case No. 20150187 
Defendant. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
I. MORRIS' CLAIMS OF GANG RETALIATION WERE NOT 
UNSUBSTANTIATED AS THE FACTS OF THIS MATTER WERE 
SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH HIS FEAR OF THE THREATS. 
A. There was Sufficient Evidence to Establish the Existence of a Substantial 
Threat and thus the Threat was not Vague or Indefinite. 
UT. R. CIV. P. Rule 45 discusses fear of retaliation from harm for testimony as 
follows: 
An order compelling compliance shall protect the person subject to or 
affected by the subpoena from significant expense or harm. The court may 
quash or modify the subpoena. If the party or attorney responsible for issuing 
the subpoena shows a substantial need for the information that cannot be met 
without undue hardship, the court may order compliance upon specified 
conditions. 
Logue filed a Motion in I..imine to Prohibit Description, Use, or References to Gangs and 
Incarceration in the case, to which the State filed its memorandum in opposition on December 
22, 2014, RL:01478; RL:01545. 
On December 15, 2014 the Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Brandon Wright and 
Memorandum in Support was filed. RL:01513. Such Motion indicated that on October 21, 
2014 Wright had an interview with law enforcement indicating that he had previous 
affiliation with a gang called Silent Aryan Warriors ("SAW"), from which he claimed to have 
retired in 2006. RL:001512. Wright indicated that when he returned to prison that SAW was 
under new management, he could not retire, and would be required to "push steel." Id. and 
at Exhibit '~-" Wright's letter to law enforcement demonstrated the ability of SAW to 
impose fear, retaliation, and harm against those who do not comply with SAW demands or 
against those who testify against SAW members: 
I was also recently ordered to carry out a stabbing by someone who told me if 
I did not go through with it he would have to send me out sideways. He added 
emphasis that he was another breed of killer and that he is in charge now. He 
told me he has already ordered two other stabbings that have been carried out 
here in the prison in the last year ... He told me details about his currently 
pending murder that I think only the killer could possibly know and so I need 
you to please ask the Utah County Prosecutor to come and talk to me ASAP. 
He provided me with the shank and told me how to do it ... Instead of 
carrying out my order I created a big (obvious) commotion (hitting doors, etc.) 
and ensured immediate officers attention was drawn to the situation. I was 
brought to Uinta II for possession of the shank ... 
RL1510-11. 
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In his interview, Wright told law enforcement specifics about the crime in this matter 
that he had learned from being incarcerated with Logue. RL:001511. Wright told law 
enforcement that Logue and ''Wicked," which is an alias for Morris, went to beat someone 
up, parked away from the house, approached the house, and walked on the front lawn. 
RL:001510. Wright indicated the individual they were looking for was on the front porch on 
his phone. Id. The individual told Wicked and Logue that he would call police if they came 
any closer. Id. Wright told law enforcement that Logue then shot him, but that Logue had 
acted impulsively and did not mean for it to happen that way. Id. Wright told law 
enforcement that after the shooting, Logue and Wicked "got lost", Logue stashed the gun, 
Wicked got sick at a store, and that Logue returned to where the gun was and sw_itched it for 
a different gun. Id. The State's Opposition was filed December 29, 2014, RL:01581. 
On February 3, 2015 the Order on Motion in Umine to Prohibit Description, Use, or "Reference 
to Gangs and Incarceration was entered, directing that no evidence of the gang name "Silent 
Aryan Warriors" or SAW would be permitted. RL:02093. On that same date, the Order on 
the Motion in I.Jmine to Exclude the Testimony of Brandon Wright was entered, determining that 
Wright's testimony was not so unfair that its admission would violate the fundamental 
concept of justice. RL:002099. Thus, Wright's evidence was admitted. 
In the Brief of Appellee the State argues that Morris only presented vague evidence that 
he feared retaliation from the prison gang if he testified against Logue. Ibid. at p. 9. 
However, Morris' evidence was not for purposes of trial, but to be determined by the trial 
court as to his personal safety if he provided evidence at trial. Morris only needed to present 
evidence that was not already before the court, and a substantial amount of evidence had 
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already been presented in pretrial and otherwise on the fact that Purcell's death was gang-
affiliated in response to snitching, that such gang had also had Wright commit a violent act 
while in prison at their direction, and in other instances presented by Wright. In all, the court 
had information about three prison stabbings ordered by the gang from Wright, as well as 
Purcell's death for what later was determined to be incorrect information that he had 
snitched on another gang member with regard to drugs. Yet the court determined, and the 
State continues to argue in its brief, that there is insufficient evidence of fear of retaliation by 
SAW if Morris publicly testified against Logue at trial. In reality, the State and court did not 
comply with UT. R. Crv. P. 45 because nothing was done to "protect the person subject to or 
affected by the subpoena from significant ... harm." The State was only focused on 
convicting Logue -- not about protecting Morris from gang retaliation. The State simply 
viewed Morris as being involved and a member of the gang itsel£ It is unacceptable for the 
State and the trial court to place Morris--a prison inmate--in fear of his life, by compelling 
him to testify against a fellow SAW gang member, and not provide protection as required by 
Rule 45. 
The State argued that the only evidence Morris presented which showed his fear 
against retaliation were two (2) lines present in the Motion to Quash. This evidence was that: 
(1) that other persons or witnesses claimed to have been threatened; and (2) that he was at 
risk of suffering substantial bodily harm or death if he gave testimony in a homicide case due 
to the dangerous circumstances of the prison environment. Id The State overlooks their 
entire case itself. Purcell was perceived to be a snitch by the gang with whom he, Morris and 
Logue were allegedly affiliated. It was clear that this gang had previously followed-through 
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on threats and would do so again. This is compelling evidence that a substantiated fear 
existed. The State and trial court knew about such evidence but yet failed to protect Morris 
as required by Rule 45. Thus, the State's argument fails. 
Although the gang evidence was limited in front of the jury, the State and the trial 
court were fully aware in pretrial motions and through Wright and other's preliminary 
hearing testimony and interviews of the gang affiliation. The murder charge against Logue 
was considered by the State to be ordered by another gang member, Yuri Lara. Purcell's 
death was simply a speculation by gang leaders that he snitched about something much less 
severe than the murder at issue in the case, yet the gang retaliated in a severe -manner with 
the death of Purcell. The likelihood of retaliation against another member testifytng against a 
member when it publicly implicated them in a crime was much more substantial. Morris' 
substantiated fear was real. Yet the State and the trial court ignored Morris' argument that an 
evidentiary hearing should have been held to address the evidence that supported his fear of 
retaliation, instead allowing the issue to be summarily determined in opposition to the 
already substantial evidence attending the underlying crime itself. 
The State focuses on other issues including Due Process and Duress, which will be 
addressed below. However, the State has failed to understand Morris' argument. Morris 
asserts the trial court had sufficient information before it given the nature of the crime with 
which Logue was charged, the State's theory that the crime itself was gang-affiliated and an 
arranged murder for the perception that Purcell had snitched on another member, as well as 
the testimony of Wright and other witnesses. There was a very real substantial threat, even 
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according to the State's own theory of the case. This alone was sufficient to warrant an 
evidentiary hearing. 
The State relies upon Piemonte v. United States, 367 U.S. 556, 559 n. 2 (1961), to show 
that the fear of retaliation is not a sufficient reason to justify refusing to testify. Appellee Brief 
at p. 17. However, this case is easily differentiated since Piemonte never raised the issue of 
fear of retaliation for testifying to overturn his contempt finding. The Piemonte court simply 
stated in passing its belief that fear of retaliation was not a legal excuse for refusing to testify; 
however, there was no analysis and likely no briefing of the issue to support this statement. 
Thus it cannot be considered a holding in that case. Piemonte would only apply if he had 
challenged the issue of the fear of retaliation for testifying in his contempt matter and the 
court had undertaken an analysis; however, he did not raise it and so Piemonte cannot be 
applied to this matter. 
The State attempts to focus attention away from Morris' position, first undertaking an 
in depth analysis that duress could be a defense to contempt. Brief of Appellee at p. 12. 
However, it is entirely irrelevant to this appeal given that Morris did not raise this argument 
since he was not given an evidentiary hearing and is strictly circumscribed to those matters in 
the record. Morris' evidence could have shown that he was overwhelmed by circumstances 
of the SAW prison gang culture that kept him from giving compelled testimony without the 
State and trial court providing him protection from substantial harm as required by Rule 45. 
Without an evidentiary hearing on the matter he cannot argue such position herein. 
Nonetheless, a substantial threat existed as was evident from the crime that was 
committed, the State's theory of the case, and Wright and other witnesses' testimonies. This 
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position is well-supported by the records on appeal. The crime itself being a gang-retaliated 
murder for perception of snitching should, at a minimum, provide sufficient evidence that a 
substantial threat to Morris' safety be presumed by the trial court and the State at least to the 
extent of providing an evidentiary hearing. However, the records evidence much more 
support than just the crime itself. Morris should have either been summarily excused from 
testifying or provided an evidentiary hearing. Summarily denying Morris' objection to 
testifying when substantial evidence existed of fear of gang retaliation in the case was an 
abuse of discretion by the trial court. There was a substantial threat of harm to Morris' 
safety. 
The State argues that Morris' fear was vague, unsubstantiated, or indefinite and 
therefore "insufficient to assert a compulsion defense let alone establish one." Brief of 
Appellee at p. 12. This argument contravenes the State's entire theory below that gang 
member Yuri Lara ordered other gang members Morris and Logue to murder gang member 
Purcell on the basis that Purcell had snitched on him to law enforcement regarding Yuri's 
possession and sale of drugs. This was not considered "vague, unsubstantiated, or indefinite" 
when the State presented its theory to the jury. If they are altering their theory of the case on 
appeal, it would create a manifest injustice for Morris and quite possibly Logue, requiring 
reversal. See, e.g., Obradovich v. Walker Bros. Bankers, 80 Utah 587, 16 P.2d 212 (Utah 
1932)("That a litigant, having tried his case on one theory in the lower court, cannot be 
permitted to change his theory on appeal, must be regarded as settled in this jurisdiction."); 
Evans v. Shand 74 Utah 451, 280 P. 239 (Utah 1929)("[O]n appeal the parties are restricted to 
the theory on which the case was prosecuted or defended in the court below ... the 
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statement of the cause of action or ground of defense as laid binds the court as well as the 
parties; and that there must be no departure is but another statement of the maxim that it is 
vain to prove what is not alleged.") 
The SAW gang was not afraid to significantly retaliate in a very violent manner 
against an individual they perceived to be snitching on them for drug possession and sales, as 
substantially evidenced in the records on appeal. That threat would be even greater to Morris 
for giving public testimony against gang member Logue at trial. This was not a vague, 
unsubstantiated, or indefinite threat. It was an obvious one. The State cannot ignore this 
evidence. The facts of the case alone are sufficient to establish retaliation as they show prior 
retaliation of the SAW gang to which Morris belonged. 
The State continues to focus much attention away from the facts of this case and the 
witnesses' testimonies by arguing that Morris' letter sent to the prosecutor did not mention 
fear of retaliation as a reason for not testifying, but focused instead on Morris' plea 
agreement preventing the State from subpoenaing him. Appellee's Brief at p. 14. Morris did 
not raise this issue in his letter to the prosecutor because it would have been futile. His fear 
of retaliation for testifying was an argument that needed to be made to the trial court, not 
just the prosecutor. In any event, the argument was made to the trial court and no 
protection was provided to Morris as required by Rule 45. The State's ongoing position 
below and on appeal that they believe Morris should have no fear of retaliation supports that 
to do so would have been futile to mention it in a letter to them. 
The State tries to rely on the fact that Brandon Wright, who was an inmate in prison 
with Morris and Logue and a member of the same gang, still testified against Logue. The 
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State uses these circumstances to support their argument that Morris' subpoena should not 
have been quashed. Brief of Appellee at p. 16. However, Wright maintained ulterior motives 
for wanting to snitch. He already feared for his life because he had tried to leave the gang, 
and testifying put him in no greater danger. He sought transfer or leniency in exchange for 
his testimony. The State, fully aware of the final deal with Wright, has not indicated what 
result they provided in exchange for such testimony. Post-trial, Wright has appeared in the 
news after confessing to a previous unrelated murder in Washington State, likely impacting 
his decision to testify against Logue regardless of what the gang threatened. 
B. Morris Sought Protection 
In Wang v. Reno it discusses that when a person is in the custody of the State, the State 
has some responsibility for the person's safety and well-being as follows: 
In DeS haney v. Winnebago County Department of S odal Services., the Court held 
that 'when the State takes a person into his custody and holds him there 
against his will, the Constitution imposes some responsibility for his safety 
and general well-being." [footnote omitted] In so holding, the Court explained 
that when the government creates a special relationship with a person by 
placing him in a vulnerable situation, the substantive component of the 
Due Process Clause obligates the government to provide for that 
person's basic needs and to protect him from deprivations of liberty. Id. 
489 U.S. 189, 199-200, 109 S.Ct. 998, 1005, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989). Having 
placed Wang in custody, the government had an obligation to protect 
him from liberty deprivations he faced by virtue of his testimony in court. ... 
Wang has proven facts sufficient to establish a violation of his liberty interest 
in personal security and thus of his due process rights secured by the 
Fifth Amendment. See Wood, 879 F.2d at 591 n. 8., 
Ibid., 81 F.3d 808, 816-20 (9th Circuit) (1996). 
The State argues that Morris did not ask for protection from the State when he was 
subpoenaed to testify. Brief of Appellee at p. 17. However, the State is mistaken in this 
argument. Morris was asking for protection when he filed his motion to quash. The 
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granting of the motion would have protected Morris because it would have eliminated him 
from testifying and thus eliminated the threat. It would have given the gang no reason to 
retaliate against him. 
The State also argues that Morris did not show how the prison system was inadequate 
to protect him from danger but the State concedes a prison transfer could have also 
protected him. Brief of Appellee at p. 18. Reno at p. 816. Yet the State fails to realize that 
Wright is the perfect example of how the Department of Corrections cannot protect 
Morris. Even though he told the gang he had retired, he was still ordered to carry out a 
prison stabbing or face retaliation. Wright also indicated at least two other stabbings in 
prison that had occurred by gang order. The gang is not small. SAW's presence is pervasive 
at the Utah State Prison and there is no place to get away from it at that facility. Transferring 
Morris to a rural county jail facility may have protected him from substantial harm. If he 
had testified, it is more likely than not that Morris would be at high risk of substantial harm 
by SAW at the Utah State Prison facility. Yet because no evidentiary hearing was held in this 
matter, none of this evidence could be presented. 
The State also believes that it was Morris' burden to show that there was a specific 
threat of imminent harm before it was required to take steps to protect him. The facts of 
this case alone, and the State's own theory of the case, was more than enough to place the 
State and trial court on notice that it needed to protect any witnesses that testified on its 
behal£ However, the State does not accept responsibility for this, but places a burden on the 
witness and then opposes any evidentiary hearing on the matter. The State simply did not 
care about protecting witnesses who are members of the gang. The State believes they are 
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just entitled to whatever information the witness possesses if it will help their case, even if it 
threatens lives. There was significant evidence of the threat of retaliation in this matter. So 
much threat that most responsible prosecutors would have looked into the witness 
protection program and other programs to make sure the witness was protected. The State 
did not try to provide Morris any protection in this matter. 
C. Preservation appropriately occurred in this Matter 
The preservation requirement states that, "[a]n issue is preserved for appeal only if it 
was "'presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court [had] an opportunity to 
rule on [it].""' Wohnoutka v. Kelley, 2014 UT App 154, if4, 330 P.3d 762, dting 438 Main St. v. 
Ea~ Street Heat, 2004 UT 72, if51, 99 P.3d 801 (quoting Brookside Mobile Home Park, Lid. v. 
Peebles, 2002 UT 48, if 14, 48 P.3d 968). 
The State argues that Morris did not raise the issue of the fear of retaliation at oral 
arguments and thus, it cannot be raised now. Brief of Appellee at p. 19. However, the State is 
incorrect in this argument because Morris raised the issue of his fear of retaliation in his 
Motion to Quash and the State raised the issue in oral arguments, which caused preservation 
to occur. Both parties presented it to the trial court in such a way that the court had an 
opportunity to rule upon the issue. Kelley at iJ4. It does not say that the issue has to be 
raised by the party who is making the oral argument. The State raised the issue of retaliation 
at oral arguments which allowed the trial court to hear it and rule on it. The State also raised 
it when discussing the Motion to Quash which is evidenced by the two (2) sentences 
mentioned by the State in their Brief of Appellee and argued supra. There was also much 
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discussion about the issue during oral arguments. Both parties addressed it and it was ruled 
on by the trial court. The State cannot now argue that this issue was not preserved. 
The State also believes that Morris did not preserve the claim that his fear of 
retaliation outweighed any need for his testimony and that such issue was not raised below, 
that Morris never invited the trial court to weigh the need for his testimony against the fear 
of retaliation and that such argument is without merit. Brief of Appellee at p. 18. The State 
fails to realize that "weighing" is accomplished as a final determination of the court, not 
something specifically requested, and thus it did not require preservation. The State believes 
that the trial court did not commit plain error and had no way of knowing that Morris' fear 
outweighed the need for his testimony because it was never argued before the court. 
However, it was argued in Morris' objection, at the oral arguments, and presented in other 
evidence in the case placing the court on significant notice that it needed to undertake such 
weighing of the evidence. 
The State's argument seems to be more towards the idea that Morris' testimony was 
not cumulative and that Morris did not address this and should not be excused. However, 
Morris addressed this by showing the State had sufficient evidence to convict Logue without 
his testimony. The State erroneously believes that Morris was arguing that "a subsequent 
conviction can purge a contempt finding for a witness who refuses to testify." Appellee Brief 
at p. 20. Morris only raised this statement in support of his testimony being unnecessary not 
as controlling of the issue. The State believes this to be hindsight evidence; however, they 
knew the anticipated testimony of all of their witnesses. They claim the firsthand account 
that could be provided by Morris was not cumulative; however, they had Wright testifying 
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even after Logue's objection, who obtained the information firsthand from Logue of the 
same information Morris would have provided. Wright's testimony rendered Morris' 
testimony cumulative, with Wright providing greater testimony coupled with a confession 
from the defendant himself. Morris is not arguing that a subsequent conviction purged 
contempt findings. He is arguing that his testimony even at the time he was called to give it 
was unnecessary to convict Logue. 
The State also argues that Logue's conviction is irrelevant to Morris' contempt 
conviction. Brief of Appellee at p. 20. However, the State is incorrect in this matter. Logue's 
conviction is very relevant. The jury found in favor of the State's theory that this was a for-
hire murder, which the State and court knew originated from gang retaliation. A responsible 
prosecutor would not have placed Morris in danger but would have protected him, 
particularly because there was sufficient evidence to obtain a conviction without his 
testimony. The State believed they would not need to call Morris, as is evidenced in their 
plea negotiations with him. "'(et after he entered his plea, the State decided they needed 
Morris' testimony. They had not obtained any further evidence after that moment, except 
possibly Wright's testimony. It is unclear why the State thought Morris' testimony was so 
necessary when they did not appear to believe it would be at the time he entered his plea 
agreement. Wright's testimony did render Morris' testimony cumulative and showed that it 
was not necessary to convict. Thus, Morris should not have been called upon to testify. 
II. MORRIS HAD THE FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AND 
THUS SHOULD NOT HA VE BEEN REQUIRED TO TESTIFY 
U.S. CONST. Al\IBND. V discusses an individual's right to not be compelled to be a 
witness against themselves as follows: 
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No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, 
unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising 
in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of 
war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to 
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
In American Fork City v. Crosgrove the Utah Supreme Court stated that, "the manifest purpose 
of the constitutional provisions, both of the States and of the United States, is to prohibit 
the compelling of testimony of a self-incriminating kind from a party or a witness." Ibid., 
701 P.2d 1069, 1072 (Utah 1985). 
The State argues that Morris had no Fifth Amendment privilege to claim as the State 
had granted him immunity in this matter. Brief of Appel/ee at p. 23. The State argues that 
even if Morris was charged by the federal government for any crimes arising from this 
matter the State's grant of immunity prevented the federal government from using any 
testimony that was compelled by the immunity grant. Id. However, the State cites no 
authority to support this contention and the cited cases can be differentiated as is discussed 
herein and below. 
The State relies upon the matter of State v. Bond, 2015 UT 88, ,I29, 361 P.3d 104, to 
establish the fact that Morris could not be prosecuted for his testimony in any federal 
prosecution because he had been granted immunity by the State. However, the matter of 
the Fifth Amendment privilege had been raised in Bond based upon Bond's belief that the 
State had committed prosecutorial misconduct by calling the witness Retting to testify 
knowing that he would invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege. It was not raised because 
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Retting feared that his testimony would be used against him in future prosecutions, which is 
what occurred in this matter. Thus, Bond is significantly different from the instant matter. 
The matter of U.S. v. Bal.rys upon which the State also relies to show that Morris 
could not be prosecuted in a federal case is different from the instant matter in that in Bal.rys 
the Government wanted to obtain testimony from Balsys regarding war crimes and his 
immigration to the United States. Balsys was worried about testifying because he would be 
testifying against a foreign country. Ibid., 524 U.S. 666, 671, 118 S.Ct. 2218, 141 L.Ed.2d 575 
(1998). The crimes committed here are not even close to the testimony that Balsys was 
compelled to give and thus, Bal.rys cannot be relied upon by the State. 
The State also relies upon the case of Knapp v. Schweitzer to support its argument that 
Morris could not claim Fifth Amendment privilege. Ibid., 357 U.S. 371, 78 S.Ct. 1302, 2 
L.Ed. 1393 (1958). However, Knapp involved charges of racketeering and bribery and was 
held before a grand jury which is dissimilar from the instant matter, thus, it cannot be relied 
upon as support for the argument in this matter. 
The final case upon which the State relies is Murpf(y v. Wate,front Commission of New 
York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964). In this matter the State contends that any testimony that 
Morris presents cannot be used in a federal prosecution against him. However, the State 
again fails to realize that Murpf(y is not similar to the instant matter as it only deals with 
testimony given to the waterfront commission about a work stoppage. It was not a criminal 
matter and did not involve the serious charges that exist in this matter and thus, it is different 
and should not be relied upon. 
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The State has failed to present any authority that shows that Morris was not entitled 
to the Fifth Amendment privilege. U.S. CONST. AMEND. V; Crosgrove at 1072. The supporting 
cases upon which it relies can be differentiated in this matter. Therefore, the State has not 
proven that Morris was not entitled to the Fifth Amendment privilege and its argument fails. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Morris respectfully requests the 
contempt conviction be reversed and with instructions on remand that the felony charge of 
obstruction of justice charge be dismissed with prejudice, and that this Court grant any 
further relief it deems necessary. 
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